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Abstract 
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insofar as to focus on issues central to current cultural policy research and its contingent questions of 
interpretation (such as the meaning of a ‘cultural right’ in particular social contexts). The secondary 
aim of this article is to define how cultural policy research (historically invested in particular historical 
evolution of national arts traditions and heritage management) could be central to the study of 
‘rights-based’ global development. 
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Introduction 
Cultural Rights, in their various iterations as 
precepts, principles and ultimately internationally-
recognised laws, are clear and specific, and to be 
found in varying form all nine of the international 
Human Rights treatises. Clarity and specificity, 
however, is less forthcoming in the application 
and implementation of Cultural Rights, and there 
arises a consequent challenge in determining how 
cultural policy can delimit and reinforce a realm of 
rights within the cultural sphere. The challenge is 
in some ways a mirror image of the challenge 
facing sociologists when attempting to delimit a 
specific sphere of social life called “the cultural”. 
The characteristics of “culture” are subject to 
interminable debate, interpretation and 
contestation, and do not apparently adhere to the 
usual coordinates of social life – as self-evidently 
framed by the private, the civil, political or 
economic realms. Culture is of course a “realm” of 
social life and yet permeates (and thus faces 
demands from) all other realms. 
 
Thus, culture has traditionally been regarded by 
scholars as the most pervasive expression of social 
identity and collective self-determination, 
tradition and heritage, but is also noted by its 
facility for differentiation (or seemingly endless 
mutability). Moreover, while culture is intrinsically 
“collective”, it provides for the means of profound 
individualisation, dissent, protest and the self-
representation of ‘particular’ interests. Culture, as 
defined by UNESCO, ranges from the historical-
intellectual traditions of the arts and philosophy, 
to the everyday utilitarian design of shelter, 
clothing or making food, to media, design, 
technology and small-scale industrial production 
(Huxley, 2010; Singh, 2011; UNESCO, 2015b). In its 
entirety, culture is therefore not a single object of 
law or public policy, and so its relation to universal 
Human Rights is particularly intriguing. All seven 
UNESCO Conventions offer a robust assertion of 
culture as an object of international law, the last 
of which – the 2005 Convention on the Protection 
and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural 
Expressions (UNESCO, 2005) – attracted an almost 
unprecedented unanimity in passing through the 
UN Assembly. Yet its legal force in the realm of 
Human Rights remains muted (Donders, 2015). 
The hope that the multivalent, multidimensional 
and endlessly differentiated phenomenon of 
culture could be made specific through the 
creative industries and concomitant policies for 
creativity is somewhat disappointing (O’Connor, 
2016). But this, it must be said, is less of a concern 
in the Global North, where culture is 
institutionalised and professionalised (where 
rights to and in “the arts” or “cultural sector” is 
defined and protected by other legal frameworks); 
beyond the North and into the Global South, the 
question of rights are somewhat more urgent and 
complex. Though, even in Europe, with the rise of 
multiculturalism under mass migration, the “right” 
of, or to, culture is becoming less obvious. There 
is, in fact, altogether little research on the 
jurisprudence of Human Rights as a 
“hermeneutics” of the cultural – how 
international law defines what culture is, and 
could be, under radically changing social 
conditions (Lury, 1993; Borelli, Lenzerini, 2012; 
Goonasekera, Hamelink, Iyer, 2003). Of 
consequent interest to this article, therefore, is 
how the legal appropriation of culture as an object 
of international law has in turn defined what 
counts as culture itself, particularly for policy 
makers. It is the purpose of this article to chart the 
various semantic, epistemic and hermeneutic 
implications of culture as an object of human 
rights law – exposing the areas of lack in cultural 
policy research. 
 
The aims of this article are therefore necessarily 
expansive, and will involve broaching a theoretical 
account of the landscape of Cultural Rights as a 
cognitive discourse on culture – as a way of 
understanding culture and its potential 
appropriation in a global (i.e. universal) social or 
“public” realm. The term “public” cannot be 
assumed to be universal, of course, but can be 
used as a political metaphor for a putative social 
realm of self-determination outside the orbit of 
the State and even supra- or inter-state systems 
(McGuigan, 2005; Rao and Walton, 2004). The 
central trajectory of this article therefore works 
towards making Cultural Rights explicit in their 
relevance to the scholarly field of cultural policy 
research, and this will involve defining the legal-
institutional sphere of rights and their range of 
applications only insofar as to focus on cultural 
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policy issues and questions of interpretation. The 
assumption underlying this direction of inquiry is 
that all too often public policies for culture avoid 
certain areas of culture or activity; as noted 
above, they are perhaps too diffuse a subject – 
culture is subject to endless variables, contextual 
and environmental conditions. The task of cultural 
policy is to make the diffuse specific, if all too 
often culture is defined principally in terms of 
established historical categories (“the arts”, for 
instance) or is framed by another category of 
policy (social policies on access for marginalised 
people, for example). This article will not attempt 
to explain how Cultural Rights have emerged 
historically from human rights (which is a task left 
to other articles in this special issue, and see 
Stamatopoulou, 2007; Barth, 2008; and Orgad, 
2015), but will indeed remark upon the 
institutional apparatus of UN Human Rights 
system and what it teaches us about how Cultural 
Rights become human rights by their operation 
with the “field” of culture or within, say, the range 
of competencies afforded an institution like 
UNESCO. 
 
The secondary aim of this article is to define how 
cultural policy research (historically invested in 
particular historical evolution of national arts 
traditions and heritage management) could be 
central to the study of global development. If 
culture is indissolubly bound up with the interface 
of society and environment, then it is strategically 
relevant to the politics of sustainable 
development – as promoted and applied by the 
UN, its agencies and the vast development 
community of development, aid and relief INGOs, 
and also regional courts and member state 
institutions (Ghai, Emmerij, and Jolly, eds., 2004). 
The challenge of Cultural Rights is to frame the 
shifting relation between universal and particular 
– the global and the local, between UN-level legal 
terminology and its specific (and fair and just) 
application to local, often very traditional, places 
and situations.  
 
A summary of the spectrum of literature and 
research on the subject of Cultural Rights is not 
altogether possible here, although it is necessary 
to refer to the sources of inspiration as much as 
information on the part of this particular article: 
the UNESCO discourse known as ‘Culture and 
Development’ remains a huge if neglected 
resource. Significant publications that define this 
discourse feature below, but a preliminary 
reference must be made to the collection of 
papers published as the book Cultural Rights and 
Wrongs (Institute of Art and Law and UNESCO, 
1998). While focussing on the challenges for 
cultural policy in the face of indigenous peoples, 
the book is animated by reflections on the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
underscores its continued relevance. A latter 
publication, Exploring Cultural Rights and Cultural 
Diversity, has also been important in scoping this 
subject (Blake, 2014). 
The preparations for Wroclaw (Poland) European 
Capital of Culture 2016, gave rise to two 
conferences that featured notable representatives 
from European universities and cities – the 
Council of Europe, European Institute for 
Comparative Cultural Research (ERICarts) and the 
European Association of Cultural Researchers 
(ECURES) – concerned with cultural research and 
Cultural Rights. Informed by the significant EC/ 
ERICarts collaboration on the Compendium of 
Cultural Policies & Trends in Europe, a 
monumental publication emerged, Culture and 
Human Rights: the Wroclaw Commentaries 
(Wiesand, Chainoglou, Sledzinska-Simon, and 
Donders, 2016). This, arguably more than any 
publication before it, has consolidated the subject 
of Cultural Rights as a research sub-field for 
cultural policy. Reference must also be made to 
the position paper and declaration ‘The Right to 
Culture as a Human Right – A Call to Action’ 
(Warsaw/Wroclaw, 2014) as well as a reminder of 
the historic European Cultural Convention (Paris, 
1954), which it echoes and which remains a 
necessary reference point for all dialogue on 
culture and rights (including the European 
Convention on Human Rights of 1950, The 
European Social Charter of 1961, and The 
European Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities of 1995). 
 
The Council of Europe, over the years, has built on 
the 1954 Cultural Convention to provide for 
numerous research projects and publications 
relevant to our subject. This includes ongoing 
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citizenship studies (Laaksonen, 2010; cf. Bîrzéa, 
Kerr, Mikkelsen, Froumin, Losito, Pol, Sardoc, 
2004), the design of democratic competencies (cf. 
the recent three volume Reference framework of 
competences for democratic culture (Council of 
Europe, 2018), and the evolving Indicator 
Framework on Culture and Democracy (IFCD: 
Council of Europe, 2018). Other notable areas of 
research literature closer to the subject of the 
arts-and human rights include the edited volume 
Music & Cultural Rights  (Weintraub and Yung, 
2009), the few research articles on cultural 
policies and cultural rights (Baltà and Dragicevic 
Šešic, 2017) and the very many on law and 
international treatises (a particularly helpful 
volume being Economic, Social and Cultural Rights  
in Action edited by Baderin and McCorquodale in 
2007. In each example of the diversity of literature 
on this subject, a central problematic one 
encounters is interpretative – how we locate an 
indissoluble interconnection between the 
abstractions of legal universality (international 
legal principles) and the specific realms of cultural 
actions, objects and agency. 
The Conundrum of the Cultural 
Cultural policy is, de facto, a matrix of value 
propositions. Functioning as the political 
management of cultural discourse, organisation 
and production, the role of policy (national and 
local) is intrinsically normative and often 
prescriptive on the local functioning of culture in 
society and economy. The complexity of cultural 
policy as a research field is, at least in part, 
because political authority is rarely effective in 
achieving hegemony and most cultural production 
only occurs as power is devolved to professional 
or expert agents and actors (institutions, funding 
bodies), and the fact, of course, that large realms 
of ‘culture’ always remain outside policy 
governance altogether – a central if often 
neglected task of cultural policy research is, 
therefore, to step outside the continuum of policy 
and politically authorised management in order to 
examine the broader politics of that continuum: 
the outcomes, people, places and processes, by 
which culture inhabits broader realms of social, 
civic and economic life. Indicative of this is the 
proliferation of research involving the relation 
between cultural participation and social justice – 
principally for the arts (Wilson, Gross and Bull, 
2017), urban development (Mould, 2015) and 
museums and institutions (Sandell, 2016). 
 
There are also many objects of cultural policy that 
are already inflected with rights-based 
assumptions and even terminology. These 
commonly include disability policy, equality and 
diversity policies, widening access, education, 
outreach (community) policy, information and 
communications policy, and so on. These are all 
interconnected, of course, and are often enforced 
by funding agencies without explicit reference to 
their legal origin or their international legitimacy. 
It is easy to see human (and cultural) rights simply 
through the context of their incorporation into 
domestic or national law (and applied in a range 
of directives and procedures into institutional life). 
Museums and other national institutions of 
culture can often appear to be rights-driven, in 
terms of their approach to marketing, access or 
“audience development” policies (Arts Council 
England, 2018; cf. Home, 2016). Assumptions on 
the “right” of a public to both access and enjoy 
public institutions in UK has its origins in the 
nineteenth century, but has evolved into a more 
explicit legal mandate for communication and 
information, often according to pre-identified 
market segments or other categorisations. Since 
Bourdieu’s now famous studies on French society 
(Bourdieu, 1979/1984), the notion that culture is a 
condition of both individual social mobility and 
economic opportunity has formed a set of 
normative principles for museums and public 
galleries, whose perceived responsibilities are 
often discharged (with mixed impact) in terms of 
education or 'outreach' programmes (Jensen, 
2013). 
 
Moreover, with regard public institutions of 
culture, the attribution of rights cannot be 
assumed to prioritise the citizen or human 
subject: an institution can exercise rights, indeed 
culture itself is awarded rights – to be preserved, 
protected from people or their physical 
environment. The recent work of the International 
Committee of the Blue Shield (ICBS: ‘Blue Shield 
International’) in Syria is a reminder that culture 
cannot be assumed only to be public property or 
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an endless resource to be used at will (even in the 
perceived interests of a given public, such as a 
society steadily conforming to religious 
conservatism). Heritage is no longer defined in 
terms of patrimony, as the early UN Convention 
for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event 
of Armed Conflict (The Hague Convention of 1954) 
underlined. 
 
Common assumptions on the cultural function of 
rights are also evident in policy trends that have 
emerged from ‘identity politics’ or the privileged 
recognition afforded to minority groups who ‘self-
identify’ with a set of sectorial interests. Identity 
politics is often confused with the sprawling set of 
political principles identified as multiculturalism, 
and multiculturalism is often confused with 
pluralism or other concepts attempting to set out 
how a given country or place can maintain 
cohesion and unity while admitting radical cultural 
difference (cf. Charles Taylor’s classic statement: 
Taylor, 1994). While Western liberal democracies 
are themselves currently in a state of flux as to the 
conditions of belonging, allegiance and citizenship, 
the role of culture in national and local 
membership remains an open debate (Phillips, 
2007). This is perhaps why rights and culture 
together find a specificity in the realm of protest, 
resistance or oppositional politics – such as the 
Right to the City movement, or the less radical 
(but no less important) Agenda 21 for Culture, or 
even UNESCO and its crusading rhetoric in using 
science, culture and education to transform the 
world in the cause of justice (cf. the current issue 
of The UNESCO Courier, October-December 2018). 
Rights discourse tends, of course, to appear as an 
ethically-charged political campaign, and is now 
deeply embedded within global policy 
innovations, like the UN’s Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) and more explicitly as 
in UNESCO’s two ‘global priorities’ as Africa and 
Gender Equality, where gender equality is often 
defined as a solution to poverty or economic 
development but nonetheless motivated by 
human rights (UNESCO, 2014). Rights discourse 
can transform terminology, or motivate a range of 
neologisms promoting a form of justice and 
recognition. 
 
Rights activism has been attributed less to the 
realm of citizen-based protest or resistance than 
the operation of regional courts, legal 
professionals and NGOs. The low-key but enduring 
influence of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR), for example, has provoked political 
consternation in the UK but its evolving history of 
case law on Cultural Rights is considerable (if yet 
to be fully assessed by research scholarship 
(Council of Europe/European Court of Human 
Rights research division, 2011). There is a sense in 
which the concept of rights should not need 
extensive research at all as it is legally self-evident 
(as any other regulation, statute or law). After all, 
rights have been around a long time: if defined in 
terms of protections and the empowerment to 
represent, express or assert one's own interests, 
we can trace a lineage of human rights from time 
immemorial (aside from legal traditions of 
philosophical thought, of the Greeks or Romans 
for example) from the Babylonian Code of 
Hammurabi (c. 1750 B.C.E.), the Torah of Israel (c 
1500), Analects of Confucius (c. 480 B.C.E.), the 
Quran (600 A.D.), the Magna Carta (1215 A.D) and 
so on and on (cf. Ishay, 2008). Pre-modern rights, 
however, in almost every case, assume or posit a 
giver of rights or absolute authority from whom 
rights are revealed or awarded (and on specific 
bases, including conditions of class, gender and 
kinship). It is English Bill of Rights (1689) that 
arguably begins to conceptualise a ‘right’ as an 
essentially political (historical and evolving) 
relation to distinct and separate powers and 
mechanisms of representation – and to an 
authority whose power is placed in question by 
virtue of the ‘right’, and therefore limited by this 
political condition of legitimacy. 
 
A further leap can be found in the 1776 US 
Declaration of Independence, 1787 Constitution 
and the 1789 French Declaration on the Rights of 
Man and the Citizen. These declare an absolute 
distinction between an individual and a corporate 
authority, and define their relation in contractual 
terms. But where all previous iterations of general 
rights were but one component on a spectrum of 
sovereign-awarded competencies, responsibilities 
and duties, it was the post-War Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) that first set 
out the features of a non-awarded right (an 
assumed right) that remain formative of our 
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concept of human rights today. Proclaimed by the 
United Nations General Assembly in Paris on 10 
December 1948, its rights do not derive from an 
authority but are assumed to be already 
possessed by every human individual. As universal 
and inalienable, rights were not, in fact, defined in 
terms of a contractual relation to any authority – 
even the authority of a putative international 
community of nations. Article 1 of the UDHR 
states that human beings are "born free and equal 
in dignity and rights". While it is true that the 1945 
UDHR echoes the natural law traditions of the 
seventeenth century, it nonetheless appeals to a 
new political reality (Danieli, Y., Stamatopoulou, 
E., Dias, C., 1999). This reality is that rights provide 
an incontestable legitimacy and mission for a 
global political sphere of united nations, but not 
issuing forth from that sphere. Rights are 
recognised, and then allowed to be actualised by 
the consensual provision of social, civil and 
political conditions required. And these tasks are 
ethical in the sense that they emerge deductively 
from an assessment of the basic conditions of 
human development before they are inflected by 
partisanship and political ideology. 
 
It is with the United Nations and its global political 
discourse of rights, that a transformation in the 
conception of basic “human life”, and even of 
culture, is still being developed and developed 
according to an ever-proliferating interpretation 
and application of rights-based ethical thought. 
The UDHR Article 19 states that "Everyone has the 
right to freedom of opinion and expression; this 
right includes freedom to hold opinions without 
interference and to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas through any media and 
regardless of frontiers". Notwithstanding the 
problematic concept of "expression", the 
qualification "regardless of frontiers" is not 
immediately apparent in the political economies 
of UN member states, East or West. It is certainly 
characteristic of the highly strategic, agenda-
driven political discourse of international relations 
since the post-War era. Its meaning, rather is to 
be found in the ethical content internal to the 
“right”. The distinction between ethics from rights 
is never wholly explicit; indeed it is this ambiguity 
that ensures that rights are equated with ethics 
and rights maintain the normative force of a 
universal and mandatory obligation. This became 
explicit with the emergence of “rights-based 
development” and approach to International 
development aid, which was initiated by the 1993 
UN World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna 
(and its subsequent Vienna Declaration). If 
provoked by the dissolution of the Soviet Bloc 
after 1991, the rights-based approach to 
development has served to integrate the three 
historic UN responsibilities of development, 
security and rights to create a more holistic "good 
society" narrative of global progress as applicable 
to the Global North as to so-called "developing" 
countries of the South. Against past classical 
modernisation theories (Walter Rostow's 1960 
anti-communist The Stages of Economic Growth 
being one of the most influential), society does 
not necessarily "develop" around the dynamics of 
economic "growth" (Rostow, 1960). Rather – in 
the formulation of the UN Declaration on the 
Right to Development proclaimed in 1986 – the 
order of priority begins with an entitlement to 
"participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, 
social, cultural and political development" (Article 
1), and where this takes place, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms are fully realised. The UN's 
rights-based approach to global development is, 
theoretically (in terms of how policy is 
conceptualised) grounded in organised 
participation aiming for the full expression of 
individual human capability and aspiration – a 
formulation shaped by Amartya Sen's concept of 
Human Development (Sen, 2000; cf. Sen, 2004) 
now central to the working ethos of the UNDP. 
 
There is a strong sense in which cultural policy can 
be fruitfully framed as a species of development 
policy (Maraña, 2010; UNESCO, 2013a). It 
promotes activities around "common" and 
inherited social practices, whose spatial, 
collective, institutional and legal conditions are 
embedded with profound powers to confer 
identity, stimulate belonging and allegiance, 
enhance or denigrate, include or exclude. A rights-
based approach to culture as development – a 
general orientation that this article promotes – 
will imply a range of obligations generally absent 
from traditional cultural policy and established 
post-War frameworks of international 
development (UNESCO, 2015a; Vlassis, 2015). It 
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implies accountability and a potential framework 
of ethical evaluation as pertaining to the people 
involved. It prioritises individual beneficiaries and 
the individuals who bear the cost of development 
(in the sense of a cost for the imposition of change 
in their common socio-economic environment). It 
awards attention to social exclusion, disparities 
and injustice. It offers a way of interconnecting 
social, economic and cultural factors in a civil and 
political context – not just the practical aims of 
development. It underlines the rule of law, and by 
implication opposes impunity and corruption. It 
promises access to justice outside 
disadvantageous local or national contexts. 
Finally, a rights-based approach to culture as 
development, theoretically at least, can be used 
to challenge power structures – the agencies and 
actors whose role involves being the neutral, 
independent or devolved media responsible for 
providing the conditions for both culture and 
development. 
Navigating the Conceptual Landscape of 
Cultural Rights  
 
Cultural Rights only became a substantive legal 
phrase with the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (UN, 1966). 
The Constitution of UNESCO (1945) remains a 
surprisingly relevant document in the historical 
evolution of a concept of a right to culture; the 
Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity 
(UNESCO, 2001), and then UN Convention on the 
Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of 
Cultural Expressions (UNESCO 2005), are the most 
recent and explicit articulation of cultural policies 
as “rights-based” policies. The Fribourg 
Declaration (UNESCO, 2007) is a landmark 
statement, based on a research project that 
consolidates the rights-based cultural content of 
all human rights treatises (from the 1948 UNDHR). 
To this short list we could add two other 
categories of treatise. Intellectual Property Rights 
(IPRs) are seminal, quite obviously: from the 
historic Berne Convention for the Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Works (1889) to the 1996 
WIPO Copyright Treaty, which has now been 
adapted to the digital age of reproduction, 
internet curation and endless sampling, editing or 
appropriation. Secondly, the discourse of 
sustainability emerged with a tacit assertion of 
“rights” conferred on nature – material nature not 
just human nature. The 1987 Brundtland Report 
and the Agenda 21 “Earth Summit” on sustainable 
development (UN, 1992; WCED, 1987) presented 
an attempted democratisation of our relationship 
with nature and its resources, favouring the 
reproductive autonomy of material nature. The 
cultural implications of this are to some degree 
expanded in the Agenda 21 for Culture (UCLG, 
2004) – an innovation of the United Cities and 
Local Governments (UCLG). Agenda 21 for Culture 
devise and negotiate frameworks of cultural 
governance for cities, integrating Cultural Rights, 
participatory cultural democracy and 
environmental sustainability. 
 
These two categories of treatise (IP law weighed 
in favour of the individual, for sustainability, ‘the 
collective’) remind one on how the spectrum of 
rights-based cultural policies necessarily appeal to 
either moral norms or fundamental ethics. Aside 
from the anthropological substrate of rights 
discourse – concerning essential human integrity 
and optimal developmental potential of the 
individual subject – a ‘right’ presupposes a 
benefactor of rights (the one in need of identity 
and recognition, the minority subject, victim, 
citizen, one belonging) or a normative ‘good’ (e.g. 
the good life; a society where freedom and self-
determination, respect and integrity, are central). 
In designing and implementing cultural policies, 
the two axes of moral imperative and social good 
should be explicit. 
 
For UNESCO, this is achieved, as noted above, 
through redefining culture as inherently “diverse” 
(in analogical comparison with biodiversity and 
natural reproduction) (UNESCO, 1995; UNESCO, 
2001; De Beukelaer, Pyykkönen, Singh, 2015). The 
essential diversity of culture is, by implication, 
always threatened by monoculture or the 
homogenising demands of nationalism and 
political authoritarianism. Political pluralism, as 
the 2001 UNESCO Declaration goes, provides for 
the social, economic and environmental 
conditions of diversity, by implication diversity 
does not evolve without collective, public or 
governmental rights to resources. A robust rights 
regime is the most significant protection by which 
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a diverse cultural realm can survive and flourish 
within the homogenising and disorientating 
impact of political and economic globalisation. 
 
Institutionally, the concept of diversity is not 
central to the UN Human Rights system as such, 
but that system often appeals to fundamental 
ethics or moral norms in its deliberations and 
negotiations (Li, 2006; Koivunen and Marsio, 
2007). When not acting specifically against a 
regime in the act of human rights infringement, 
the ethical-moral dimension of human rights 
provides a rhetoric of care and concern seemingly 
free of partisanship (i.e. a universality allied to 
basic human welfare and not specific political, 
cultural or religious alliances). This is to some 
extent why human rights law seems 
interconnected with Humanitarian law (on the 
lawful conduct of conflict) even though it is not. It 
is difficult to argue that UN member states are 
less prone to human rights abuses because of the 
work of, for example, the UNHRC; but, what is 
certain is that the wide range of human rights 
‘instruments’ – mainly the nine conventions but 
also the declarations and ‘optional protocols’ 
(treaty additions, largely for procedures of 
inclusion or exemption) – provide an effective and 
reflexive sphere to develop international 
consensus (Lee and Lee, 2010). The condition of 
consensus can be understood as discourse, for UN 
treatises function as semantic authorities 
(establish the definition of terms), epistemic 
frameworks (facilitate the process of making a 
situation intelligible to a rights-based judgement, 
or a rights-based analysis), an appending 
mechanism for cognate legal terms (such as self-
determination, discrimination, freedom and 
enjoyment) and further provide fields of eligible 
scrutiny (from practices of slavery, servitude, 
forced labour, to press or media communications, 
marriage, family and youth, to statelessness, 
asylum and refugees) (Ghai, and Cottrell, 2004; 
Leckie, Gallagher, 2006; Senyonjo, 2009; Riedel, 
Giacca, and Golay, 2014; Schmid, 2015 ). 
 
The multivalent and multi-dimensional character 
of rights therefore demands a multi-facetted 
approach – particularly given how rights always 
pertains to an embodied subject in a dynamic 
social relation to collective cultural, civil and 
political life generally. To gain any measure of 
force they need to be supported by multiple 
conditions. For member states, being both 
signatory (and ratification – its observance in 
domestic law) the formal obligations of a rights 
treatise demand three fundamental Obligations of 
Action – to respect (do not interfere), to protect 
(uphold and facilitate), and to fulfil (work toward 
their realisation) (from OHCHR, 2012a: Part II; 
OHCHR, 2012b: 18). They also demand four 
Obligations of Process – of non-discrimination 
(between groups or types of right), of adequate 
progress (political commitment), of participation 
(citizen collaboration), and of effective remedy (or 
substantive responses by authorities to the 
hindering of any of the above). For cultural policy 
research, rehearsing the Obligations of Action and 
Obligations of Process in a cultural arena (arts 
policy, or public galleries, for example) can be 
instructive. 
 
Concerning Obligations of Action, respect (non-
interference) afforded to contemporary artists, for 
example, might be an obvious application. What is 
perhaps not obvious are the boundaries of rights 
of response to art works that intentionally offend, 
ridicule or oppose other agents, groups or belief 
systems. The latter could be so adverse as to 
make the former redundant. Under the 
Obligations of Process – non-discrimination 
(between groups or types of right) might order, 
for example, an equal distribution of financial 
resources for art. Yet, this in itself may only serve 
to entrench established (and expensive) interests 
and promote the exclusionary practices that raise 
rights-issues in the first instance. Interpreting a 
cultural “right“, therefore, is only the first stage of 
implementation – and might subvert the intended 
aim of that implementation. It instantiates, 
nonetheless, how a rights-based approach to 
cultural policy must not be understood simply in 
terms of an implementation of rights terminology, 
empirically and incrementally. Rather, it calls for 
the grounding of cultural policy in a systematic 
analysis of the multivalent and multidimensional 
embeddedness of rights in the overlapping realms 
of social and cultural life. 
 
In UN OHCHR methodology, rights can be 
identified as a quantitative and objective 
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phenomenon (by a numbering of cases of blatant 
abuse, for example) or a quantitative and 
subjective phenomenon (a numbered of 
testimonials, reports, attitude surveys, on cases of 
abuse, for example: OHCHR, 2012: Part II). Rights 
can also be identified as qualitative and objective 
phenomenon (representing the force of political 
activity in support of rights, for example) or 
qualitative and subjective phenomenon (how 
public discourse in a given place reinforces 
discrimination; or the extent to which minorities 
can represent their interests in the public sphere, 
for example). These four categories of research 
data preferred by the UN system are articulated 
across three registers (in which rights as a practice 
emerges in any given social system or country): in 
(i) structural frameworks – legal, policy, 
institutions and resources programmes, and so 
on; (ii) policy supported processes and procedures 
of representation – reporting, record-keeping and 
official archiving and scrutiny of reporting, 
procedure-supported responses, and so on; and 
(iii) in outcomes – articulated by the range of 
indicators (common to policy evaluation and 
assessment) that make available official 
recognition of how rights are working or not, for 
individual, places and groups. 
 
The significance of the UN matrix methodology is 
that it allows for a thorough analytically 
comprehensive research, where agency, 
institution and programme (actions) are made 
distinct and responsibility can be apportioned. 
More importantly are the extra-bureaucratic 
function of this matrix – how it can prevent the 
direct conflation of rights and ethics (and so the 
ideological oppression that comes with the 
institutional use of “rights” as a means of power, 
or where rights can be used by one group to 
garner extra resources, or cast aspersions on 
another group). The extra-bureaucratic 
implementation of rights can also empower 
institutional activism – where it is revealed that 
institutions do not possess the resources or 
control over their own environment of operation 
because of state failings, market encroachment, 
or lack of regulatory protection, or many others. 
The implementation of rights is subject to 
multidimensional conditions that can involve 
tradition, customs and norms; infrastructure or 
resources and capacity in other cultural agencies; 
civil society and resistance groups; and other non-
state actors (such as religious groups or 
community authorities). Such a multi-dimensional 
analysis is critical when assessing the cultural 
rights of minority or migrant groups (Marks, 2003; 
Barth, 2008; Orgad, 2015; Guild, Grant and 
Groenendijk, 2018). 
 
A most significant moment in the policy relation 
between culture and human rights was UN 
resolution 10/21 in March of 2009, for the 
appointment of a Special Rapporteur in Cultural 
Rights. Article 1 of the resolution affirmed that 
"Cultural Rights are an integral part of human 
rights, which are universal, indivisible, interrelated 
and interdependent" (UNHRC, 2009: 2). The 
significance of the Special Rapporteur in this area 
is primarily intellectual – human rights becomes a 
subject of cultural analysis and hermeneutics 
("translated" into cultural terms); conversely, 
culture becomes an object of special human rights 
protections and promotions. The position of 
Special Rapporteur was occupied by Pakistan's 
Farida Shaheed (2009—2015) and is now Karima 
Bennoune (USA, since 2015). The work of this role 
remains significant, as they are effectively mobile, 
in dialogue with both the Office of the High 
Commissioner of Human Rights and the UN 
Human Rights Council, and in doing so they are 
not only pivotal to the contemporary discourse of 
culture and human rights but mandated to create 
dialogue with countries, NGOs and other agents of 
change. Their intellectual approach is "holistic", 
and so find the conceptual means of extending 
the discourse of Cultural Rights into topical areas, 
such as gender, religion and the rise of 
fundamentalism, and the negative responses to 
mass migration. The UN cannot routinely 
“enforce” human rights, but rather uses the 
pressure, persuasion and negotiation made 
possible by discourse and dialogue, notably in the 
context of integrating a rights-based development 
programme or rights-based security policy (made 
attractive to the member state through funding 
and assistance, such as training). 
 
In the Special Rapporteur’s (Farida Shaheed) Fifth 
thematic report (UNHRC, 2013: A/HR/23/34)] 
artistic freedom is positioned as a central issue for 
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human rights. Artistic expression – (to define art 
as “expression” situates it in the orbit of individual 
rights) – embodies fundamental norms of 
freedom and dignity and while individual artistic 
works can be interpreted in various ways, and 
even legitimately opposed, the opposition to 
artistic production and public display per se is a 
Cultural Rights matter. Moreover, opposition can 
emerge from unexpected places, for example, 
from limited uses of public space, or threats of 
litigation from commercial actors or copyright 
agencies for communications ancillary, to the 
artists’ work. Harassment and self-censorship are 
also cultural realities often under the radar of 
political inquiry. The now well-known example of 
artist Nadia Plesner (Denmark) starting in 2008, is 
cited in the Fifth thematic report (UNHRC, 2013: 
12), where the object of contention was an Audra 
handbag (a favourite of the socialite and media 
celebrity Paris Hilton) launched in 2003. Displaying 
Louis Vuitton’s ‘Multi colore Canvas Design’ (by 
designer Takashi Murakami), Plesner created an 
image of a starving black child holding a small dog 
and the said handbag, imprinted on T-shirts that 
were sold as ancillary to her art project and 
subsequent exhibitions. In obvious imitation of 
Hilton, but more contentiously, where the brand 
identity of the handbag was evident, design owner 
Louise Vuitton exercised legal action. Plesner’s 
project was motivated by the injustice of global 
media neglect of human suffering (at the time, the 
Darfur genocide) in the face of media fascination 
with celebrity (Paris Hilton). She observed: “‘[t]he 
point was never originally about Louis Vuitton … 
[it] was about celebrity obsession at the expense 
of things that matter. But it became about rights 
and artistic freedom” (Rigby, 2011; cf. Plesner, 
2018). 
 
The T-shirts and posters sold alongside art work 
were “retail” and yet whose proceeds were 
donated to the campaign Divest for Darfur (an 
activist NGO). In 2008 Louis Vuitton successfully 
sued at the Tribunal de Grande, Paris, where a 
subsequent €5000 a day fine was marshalled 
against Plesner for further use of the image. The 
legal basis of Louis Vuitton’s case was the 
common “Community Design right” (ownership of 
the design and its unregulated use by others 
damaged its reputation). Yet Plesner’s later appeal 
(at the Court of the Hague, May 2011) saw Louise 
Vuitton referring to Article 1 (1stProt) of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) – 
the right to property. This was in relation to 
Plesner’s legal defence appealing to ECHR Article 
10 – the right to artistic freedom. The Court 
weighed the two articles in relation to the actual 
complainant’s assertion of “damages” to 
reputation and brand and ruled the superiority of 
the right to artistic freedom. This was on the basis 
that it was (in relation to ‘democracy’) more 
fundamental (and where no damages could be 
quantified). The case is interesting, as where 
Louise Vuitton was, technically, correct in its 
appeal to brand protection, the right to culture 
was given the weight of the right to democracy 
itself. A portion of the ruling is as follows: “…the 
fundamental right of Plesner that is high in a 
democratic societies’ priority list to express her 
opinion through her art. In this respect it applies 
that artists enjoy a considerable protection with 
regard their artistic freedom, in which, in 
principle, art may “offend, shock or disturb” [here 
quoting a previous ruling in which the rights of an 
artist to offend was ruled as inviolable: European 
Court of Human Rights 25 January 2007 RvdW 
2007 452 Vereinigung Bildener künstler v Austria 
ground for the decision 26 and 33].” (Court of the 
Hague, 2011: 8). 
 
A legally defensible alliance between art and 
democracy within EU human rights law provokes 
the question, does “art” itself have rights (i.e. 
apart of the artist), and to what extent? ‘Art’ may 
be cast as the product of the artist (for the most 
part a commercial product, often for sale), the 
property of an owner (where its sale is incidental; 
its character embodies another, artistic, 
rationale), or expression, and therefore symbolic 
of the agency of the citizen and their possession of 
rights. The exercise of freedom of speech is 
deemed inherent to citizenship and thus 
democracy itself. In human rights law, 
“expression” is assumed, and yet it is not clear 
why, or whether, the agency of expression is 
essential to the conferring of a right (what of a 
work of art without an identifiable producer?) or 
whether the object is not democracy but the civil 
order (of citizens) that is the precondition of a 
functioning democracy. It may be that artistic 
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expression is a constitutive component of public 
communication and debate that is the public 
sphere (and the public sphere is the fulcrum of all 
democratic societies). Yet legal rulings re-state 
points of codified law and not theoretical 
assertion – and our questions here indicate that 
latent in the ruling on Plesner seems to appeal to 
an internal theoretical rationale – a theory of 
expression (or democratic expression) (cf. Mercer, 
2002; Tomka, G. 2013).  
 
The point here is that where law is a sphere of 
conceptual activity assumed to be explicit, literal 
and acting on a rigorous scrutiny of empirical 
reality, it nonetheless requires an intellectual 
reflexivity that betrays how far it inhabits a 
broader public discourse of civil and political scale. 
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (2000) 
Article 13 on Freedom of the Arts and Sciences 
states that “The arts and scientific research shall 
we free of constraint”. The European Convention 
on Human Rights (1950/1953) is similarly 
generous in its awarding of the arts and culture 
rights and protections, but, for example, Article 10 
in providing the right to freedom of expression at 
the same time subjects this "in accordance with 
law" and what is "necessary in a democratic 
society". While this right includes the freedom to 
hold opinions and to receive and impart 
information and ideas, it also allows restrictions 
for interests of State – which are commonly 
understood to be (principally) as follows: national 
security, territorial integrity or public safety, the 
prevention of disorder or crime, protection of 
health or morals, protection of the reputation or 
the rights of others, and preventing the disclosure 
of information received in confidence and 
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the 
judiciary.  
 
The tension between an assumption on artistic 
freedom in the face of an ever increasingly 
complex and sprawling State regime, is 
highlighted by the now established (if largely 
ineffective) discourse on the rights of the artist, 
first exemplified by the 1980 UNESCO 
‘Recommendation on the Status of the Artist’. 
Based on the UDHR, Art. 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 
and the ICESCR Art. 6 and 15, is asserted a 
recognition of artists as professionals (i.e. in legal 
and financial systems), welfare, social, union and 
institutional supports (as other workers), and the 
obligation for their participation in both cultural 
policy making and international exchange 
mechanisms. 
 
The immediate problem facing the use of the 
concept ‘artist’ as a legal term to be awarded 
rights, is the fact that the designation itself is 
unstable – who decides and on what criteria? 
While the discourse has evolved a criteria based 
on self-representation (UNESCO, 1980; EUDGIP, 
2006), such as professional associations and other 
supportive agencies, a principal challenge is, as 
noted above, the role of the State as mediator of 
internationally recognised rights – and doing so in 
terms of “local” or specific freedoms. Where the 
State is the principal agency in recognising rights 
situations, it will conceivably only do so in 
proportion to its own sovereignty. A right to 
culture implies the right to ways of life, values and 
practices outside – and even against – the 
interests and cohesion of the nation state. A 
“right” to culture can imply that individuals or 
groups outside official or national culture have a 
right to separate themselves and live differently, 
and in relation to its politically defined 
management of identity and allegiance (a nation 
state depends on its citizens for its own defence, 
e.g. in security forces and civil society cooperation 
– compromised by non-participation or non-
identification). All of this can add up to a crisis of 
‘justiciability’, which is probably the largest 
challenge facing Cultural Rights in relation to 
artistic freedom  – What rights can be articulated 
and acted on within the human rights regime (at 
whatever level) and therefore legitimised by the 
power of UN rulings. 
 
The Special Rapporteur reports consistently, if 
incrementally, aids the boundary extension of the 
justiciability of Cultural Rights. What requires 
further investigation is how the ‘cultural’ extends 
the complexion of a ‘right’ itself, as in the Special 
Rapporteur reports a ‘right’ is more than a self-
evident legal concept (of literal and explicit 
semantics, formed to be utilised by lawyers in 
legal deliberation). It is an ethical imperative for 
the recognition of the self-assertion of sub-
cultural expression or dissent in general – or any 
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forms of self-representation on behalf of 
minorities; it is a literary metaphor, validating the 
otherwise undefinable character of artistic 
expression; it is a theoretical concept deployed for 
hermeneutic purposes – for identifying the 
relation between institutionally-recognised 
cultural value and the needs, benefit or welfare of 
individuals. Political philosopher Michael Freeden 
might see cultural rights as an ideological phrase, 
indicating the validation of culture by legal 
institutions who incorporate the realm of culture 
for its use in social and economic institutions 
(Freeden, 1996). Rights, as a term, plays a 
significant discursive function within a matrix of 
other terms circulating within the evolving 
international (now global) discourse that is based 
on international treatises yet extend into media 
representation, national and local politics and so-
called identity politics or the politics of 
recognition. These terms include diversity, 
equality, multiculturalism, and where the 
integration of culture will allow for the extension 
of the role of law in the broader political 
management of social life.     
The Sources and Conceptual Resources of 
Cultural Rights  
 
The two UN covenants of 1966 – the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (both ratified ten years later) – can 
be understood in a purely historical context as 
articulating a political aspiration animating 
increasing demands for civil liberties in the West 
and world decolonisation everywhere else. They 
embodied the emergence of a substantive Left 
(specifically Communist) critique of the Western 
individualism embedded in the 1948 UDHR. By the 
end of the 1970s, Cultural Rights was consolidated 
as a legal and policy concept (albeit understood 
largely as contingent upon civil, economic and 
social rights), but underlined how these different 
species of rights were “in accordance with the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ideal 
of free human beings enjoying freedom from fear 
and want can only be achieved if conditions are 
created whereby everyone may enjoy his 
economic, social and Cultural Rights, as well as his 
civil and political rights” (ICESCR, preamble).  
The function of “conditions” here remains 
imprecise, nonetheless it’s clear that, 
theoretically, economic, social, cultural, civil and 
political rights provide the material conditions 
(resource, labour, organisations, and so on) for 
the realisation of “human” rights, which as human 
(categorically distinct from the economic, social, 
cultural, civil and political) are consequentially 
elevated to a quasi-ontological or existential level 
(cf. Odello, and Seatzu, 2013; Giacca, 2014). 
 
Two years later (July 1968) UNESCO convened a 
symposium, the report of which has become a 
seminal document in the field: ‘Cultural Rights as 
Human Rights’ (1970). Published as part of a 
visionary but truncated publication series (‘Studies 
and Documents on Cultural Policies’), it stated 
that (to quote an introductory passage) “Cultural 
Rights is a relatively new concept. Culture was, in 
the past, taken for granted. It was frequently 
discussed within the framework of individual 
political rights, religious liberty or the freedom of 
opinion and expression” (UNESCO, 1970: 9). 
However, as the report points out, there are new 
and major threats to the realisation of Cultural 
Rights. These can be paraphrased as follows, as 
they remain relevant almost half a century later: 
science and technology are fundamentally 
changing human mechanisms of understanding 
and communication, and even human experience 
itself; information and knowledge are becoming 
more complex; industrialisation and 
mechanisation are redefining what we mean by 
‘culture’; poverty and inequality of resource can 
disempower culture; consumer society and 
consumer choice generates cultural 
homogenisation (and so does the centralisation of 
the State and the political force of nationalism). 
And the obsolescence of tradition and distinctions 
between groups remains a serious concern. 
 
This list of issues were, then, basic observations 
on evolving modern society, indicating a huge 
dilemma. Culture was an effective register of 
these changes, yet did not (and still does not) 
possess either the means of participating in these 
changes or protecting itself against them. While 
acknowledging the historical ‘autonomy’ of artistic 
and intellectual traditions, it becomes obvious in 
the course of the report’s debates, that culture 
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itself is not autonomous in any meaningful sense 
of the term (i.e. as in a cultural polity, self-
governance or cultural management of a cultural 
realm, at least outside specific institutions). 
 
In 2010, in the first report of the new UN Special 
Rapporteur for cultural rights, Farida Shaheed 
stated that "There is no official definition of 
Cultural Rights” (UNHRC, 2010: 4). 
Notwithstanding the work of UNESCO since the 
post-war period, or the UN Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs: 2000-2015) or current 
Sustainable Development Goals (2017-2032), 
culture has at no time been defined as a specific 
“goal” or discrete self-sustaining sphere of global 
development policy. 
 
Yet, as we have noted, culture's multivalent 
permeability allows the Special Rapporteur to 
marshal a distinctive cultural analysis to diverse 
areas of social, institutional and economic life, for 
example, copyright, which (according to the 
website press release) “can have a profound 
effect on the lives of communities if not properly 
managed”; and also public space, as “Protecting 
Cultural Rights from excessive advertising: States 
should … increase the space for not-for-profit 
expressions”; and also memorialisation processes 
in post-conflict societies – “the importance of 
culture in transitional justice” (UNHRC, 2018). The 
multivalent character of culture might mean 
methodological vagueness on one level but on 
another can also allow one to extend rights 
related to culture into all other spheres of social 
life. Indeed, a milestone project that resulted in 
the UNESCO sponsored Fribourg Declaration 
(UNESCO, 2007) served to redefine all standing 
Human Rights conventions in terms of their 
cultural content, and in so doing devise six 
principle spheres of “cultural” human rights (and 
therefore rights-based policy making): 1: identity 
and cultural heritage; 2: cultural communities; 3: 
access to and participation; 4: education and 
training; 5: information and communication; and 
6: cultural cooperation. While these were already 
established areas of rights-based activity, and the 
Declaration equally notes that “Cultural Rights 
have been asserted primarily in the context of the 
rights of minorities and indigenous peoples and 
that it is essential to guarantee these rights in a 
universal manner, notably for the most destitute” 
(UNESCO, 2007: 2), it also implicates more recent 
concerns over governance, economy and public 
administration. 
 
Indeed, many Cultural Rights have been fulfilled 
by other means. Other social or development 
policies or other treatises, such as the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965), can 
facilitate Cultural Rights. Where race inevitably 
involves culture, and culture is an indissoluble part 
of identity and belonging, communal conduct and 
tradition, Cultural Rights can be supported 
effectively (if inadvertently) (cf. Auweraert, 
Pelsmaeker, Sarkin and Vandelanotte, 2002). 
 
It is a surprise to some that UNESCO possesses 
human rights violation complaints procedures, 
specifically with regard Cultural Rights (known as 
the ‘104 procedure’ of 1978: UNESCO 2009). As 
Weissbrodt and Farley have noted, UNESCO’s 
competence in Human Rights is extensive, yet has 
not evolved as the human rights system in general 
has evolved (Weissbrodt and Farley, 1994). Its 
Committee on Conventions and 
Recommendations (CR) is responsible in the first 
instance for processing complaints but the process 
there and thereafter quite deliberately uses 
confidentiality and privacy as a strategy – making 
its deliberations, actions and outcomes for the 
researcher difficult to evaluate. Its breadth of 
competency, on paper at least, is based on the 
UDHR 1948, for example, the right to education 
(Article 26 – and today, with the OHCHR, it is 
responsible for the world programme on human 
rights education, initiated by the UN General 
Assembly in 2004). It adjudicates in relation to 
rights to participate in cultural life and to share 
scientific advancement (UDHR Article 27), the 
Right to information, including freedom of opinion 
and expression (Article 19), the Freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion (Article 18) and 
the Right to freedom of association (Article 20). 
 
The UNESCO Constitution of 1945 still remains a 
seminal document in the history of Cultural Rights. 
It is effectively a global cultural policy for Cultural 
Rights through intercultural dialogue and the 
promotion of peaceful coexistence. It famously 
begins: “That since wars begin in the minds of 
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men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of 
peace must be constructed", and where its 
diagnostic is articulated as “..ignorance of each 
other’s ways and lives... of that suspicion and 
mistrust.. [of].. differences". UNESCO’s traditional 
cultural policy fields evolved throughout the 
1950s in terms of the institutions and the places 
of symbolic national traditional allegiance and 
identity (heritage, historical sites, museums, and 
so on). By the late 1960s its interests had 
extended to protections and regulations on trade; 
on conflict; copyrights and IPRs; cultural diversity 
and intercultural dialogue and its originary 
concern for International Cultural Relations (ICR). 
The policy area of Creative Economy (including an 
emphasis on digital and crafts) has hitherto 
become a central priority under the 2005 
Convention, though previously charted by 
UNCTAD. Whatever the policy area, the “rights-
based” approach animates all of them, including 
an explicit Gender Equality priority, which is a de 
facto Cultural Rights policy. 
 
The seven UNESCO cultural conventions are well-
known as distinct treatises, but can also be 
understood as significant historical-critical 
moments of an evolving political discourse on 
Cultural Rights. If considered in terms of rights, 
some important features stand out. The 1952 
Universal Copyright Convention principally 
outlines "the rights of authors and other copyright 
proprietors"; the 1954 Protection of Cultural 
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, asserts a 
"right" of cultural heritage itself as belonging to 
humankind, to be the object of protections, 
safeguards and respect. The 1970 Convention on 
the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit 
Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of 
Cultural Property, articulates the rights of places 
to be identified as the principle location of any 
given cultural heritage – of "origin, history and 
traditional setting". The 1972 Protection of the 
World Cultural and Natural Heritage ostensibly 
gives a right of heritage professionals and 
institutions to draw on international resources 
and challenge any force that prevents heritage 
capacity building; the 2001 Protection of the 
Underwater Cultural Heritage charters a new 
sphere of cultural policy: the geo-political 
geometry of territoriality, which is challenged as 
to its assumption that territory is property – 
underwater heritage is a ‘commons’. The 2003 
Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage is 
a recognition of the rights of non-professional, 
community, ethnic and religious cultural actors 
and agencies, often outside institutional 
frameworks or other legal protections; and lastly, 
the 2005 Protection and Promotion of the 
Diversity of Cultural Expressions defines the 
relation between culture and policy in a 
framework of economic globalization where rights 
are oriented to place-based cultural production. 
 
We can also see that animating each of the seven 
UNESCO cultural conventions is a legal strategy in 
"protection", of which the sovereign member 
state is steward but also accountable. Culture is 
also a sphere of international cooperation, 
professional standards and mechanisms of 
reporting, assessment and accountability. While 
UNESCO’s powers of sanction or intervention are 
weak, it does possess diplomatic influence (the 
1960 Save the Monuments of Nubia campaign in 
the face of Egypt's Aswan Dam project remains its 
most famous triumph). As with its work in human 
rights, UNESCO’s self-imposed principle of 
confidentiality is effective to the extent of the 
nature of member state cooperation and the 
promotion of rights through educational, 
informational and development projects 
(Mukherjee, 2009). Its organizational aims 
supplement its cultural diplomacy and are 
research, education, combatting discrimination, 
encouraging cooperation and promoting 
democracy. It remains a question, however, why 
UNESCO has not made more use of Cultural Rights 
as a sphere of the human rights system (promoted 
at the UNHRC), or played an increasing role now 
activated by the Special Rapporteur. Perhaps this 
is indicative of a realpolitik at the heart of 
UNESCO's "ethos" – articulated most explicitly 
perhaps in its 1966 Declaration of Principles of 
International Cultural Co-operation where (Article 
1) stated that "Each culture has a dignity and 
value which must be respected and preserved". 
While on the level of political theory this may be 
subject to some critique, UNESCO seems to be 
reticent to impose a global value system that 
denigrates some cultures despite their pre-
Enlightenment understanding of the social order, 
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gender, individuality and expression. Indeed, a 
global cultural view might understand rights as a 
legal term that appeals to a sphere of language, 
litigation and authority so often alien to the 
cultural realms of many countries in the Global 
South. In fact, to define cultural life at all in legal 
terms raises a range of questions on the 
autonomy of culture. This, for UNESCO, is an 
enduring socio-philosophical conundrum: how far 
can we assert cultural policies in the face of 
hostile or incompatible social, economic or 
religious belief systems? 
 
As noted above, the legal specificity of Cultural 
Rights as human rights pertains primarily to 
individuals (as it the UDHR itself). This does not 
necessarily make rights hostile to so-called 
collectivist societies but can indeed make the 
assertion of rights problematic. While 
‘intersubjectivity’ is a research thematic 
throughout the Humanities in the West, there is 
little theoretically-useful research on the impact 
of rights-based cultural policies on the realm of 
the subject – on the enduring collective 
identification of individuals in collectivist societies. 
How do we understand if cultural change 
generates alienation, existential confusion, or just 
social disharmony? Even in the ‘individualist’ USA, 
the divisive impact of the so-called “culture wars” 
were, and remain, notorious (Hartman, 2015). If 
the principal aims of Cultural Rights are identity, 
recognition and empowerment, then it remains an 
open question whether these can be achieved 
outside any substantive material conditions of 
change (i.e. society and its reproduction) but are 
relevant universally. Or, perhaps they may be 
achieved more effectively by informal means, not 
involving institutional means but local self-
determination, sub-cultures, resistant or militant 
organisation, religion, or "underground" 
associations. 
 
The UN Convention on the Protection and 
Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions 
(2005) is, for UNESCO, a central vehicle of Cultural 
Rights in its most expansive (non-specific) form – 
rights for cultural producers, for culture and 
heritage practices, for places and people groups, 
and for developing countries in the markets of 
international trade. Moreover, it extends legal 
legitimacy to the concept of “cultural diversity” 
and “interculturality” as necessary expressions of 
the freedom defined by rights, and where the 
notion of "cultural expressions" is broad enough 
to encompass all or most of UNESCO's principle 
concerns, from "way of life" tradition and heritage 
to contemporary arts and creative industries. This 
coverage of course, is largely conceptual, as there 
are no direct mechanisms of implementation for 
the Convention outside member states’ own 
systems of implementation, and accordingly rights 
do not explicitly feature as a clause or article of 
the Convention itself (Donders, 2015). This is 
registered by the Convention insofar as the 
Convention appeals primarily to economic 
interest, as in the adverse impact of economic 
globalisation on culture and the opportunities for 
cultural goods and trade within the new 
marketing opportunities offered by globalisation. 
Its central principle of "diversity" has an 
interesting provenance we cannot explain here, 
but at the time of the Convention's drafting was 
related to the emerging policy discourse (and 
ethical implications) of sustainability: Article 1 
asserts "...cultural diversity is as necessary for 
humankind as biodiversity is for nature"; for 
diversity is a "common heritage of humanity”. In 
the terms of the Convention, it exceeds previous 
heritage protections and requires "promotion" 
and not just protection. This promotion is, firstly, 
the assertion of human rights as proclaimed in the 
2001 Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity. 
Its general principle 1 asserts how it is 
“Committed to the full implementation of the 
human rights and fundamental freedoms 
proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and other universally recognized legal 
instruments, such as the two International 
Covenants of 1966 relating respectively to civil 
and political rights and to economic, social and 
Cultural Rights” (cf., Article 2, principle 1 in the 
Convention). 
 
The 2001 Declaration was, ostensibly, the origin of 
the 2005 Convention. While one expects revisions 
given the complex process of consensus required 
during any passage through the General 
Assembly, there arguably emerged a subtle shift in 
political orientation. In the Declaration, the first 
five articles are a veritable thesis on cultural policy 
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for an age of profound social complexity: the 
articles are entitled, Cultural Diversity: the 
Common Heritage of Humanity (Article 1); From 
Cultural Diversity to Cultural Pluralism (Article 2); 
Cultural Diversity as a factor in Development 
(Article 3); Human Rights as guarantees of Cultural 
Diversity (Article 4); and Cultural Rights as 
enabling environment for Cultural Diversity 
(Article 5). Article 7 posits culture as “well-spring” 
of creativity, generating unique form of economic 
goods and services (Article 8), and then Article 9 
asserts that only Cultural Policies can act as 
catalysts of creativity. 
 
The principle subject of the Declaration is the 
“culture” itself (and its inherent “diversity”), while 
asserting “pluralism” as the political discourse and 
governance practice most able to facilitate 
diversity. The concept of pluralism was a 
potentially powerful way out of the growing 
conundrum of multiculturalism (and the growing 
popular political objections and resistance to it) 
and the concurrent need for forms of government 
and governance able to facilitate an increasing 
social complexity in the face of dissolving national 
or colonialist monoculture (UNESCO, 1999). 
Moreover pluralism, as a cultural project, afforded 
cultural organisations and the arts a specific 
political mission and political agency – an agency 
whose parameters had arguably been defined in 
earlier landmarks of cultural deliberation, the 
1996 Report of the World Commission for Culture 
and Development, Our Creative Diversity 
(UNESCO, 1995). The 2005 Convention, however, 
while significant in its own terms, shifted the legal 
axis of this discourse towards national (member 
state) policies for culture and creative industries 
(with particular attention to detail pertaining to 
international trade – a concern of the 
Convention’s sponsors). Cultural policies oriented 
to globalisation remain necessary; but all sense of 
explicit political agency for culture became 
weakened, and with it an explicit framework in 
which to work for Cultural Rights. 
 
UNESCO’s central concept of “diversity” has 
remained emphatic, but to this day suffers from a 
lack of political agency in the organisations 
inclined to use it. This is perhaps apparent when 
situating cultural diversity as a policy concept in a 
now well-known critique of global neoliberalism 
and the recent tendency to orient all social or 
cultural policies to the market, trade or any other 
economic context of meaning. In reading, for 
example, David Harvey’s A Brief History of 
Neoliberalism (Harvey, 2005; 2007), a paradox 
emerges whereby “diversity” in and of itself 
presents very conducive conditions for a society 
governed by market principles. After all, 
neoliberalism favours societies where culture and 
civil society provide the conditions for collective 
values and behaviour outside of the orbit and 
influence of the State; for individual liberty and 
freedom are a neoliberal political aim and virtue 
(expressed most powerfully in the individual 
consumer and actor in the free market), and a 
strong civil society independent of State can more 
easily favour private property rights and free trade 
protections. While the 2005 Convention is without 
doubt an attempt to assert policies for protection 
and promotion within this “marketisation” of 
society scenario (as civil society is arguably always 
dominated by the market and its ruling 
corporations), it is something of a rear-guard 
action. It is an attempt at protecting culture from 
something it tacitly endorses. The Convention is 
not an attribution of political agency to those 
actors (civil society and cultural organisations) 
that could effectively combat marketisation (as 
the market begins to affect governance over the 
institutions of society and culture themselves: see 
also O’Connor, 2016). 
 
Neoliberalism is less an economic theory than a 
series of social theories on how the construction 
and imposition of ‘economic’ values on society 
and culture demonstrably affects a reduction in 
social and public values, projects and support 
systems. Public assets and goods pushed into the 
market, FDI (foreign direct investment) is 
prioritised, and the mediators of the ‘economic’ 
(whether bureaucrats or corporations) become 
more powerful actors than local government, and 
who assert the ‘rights’ of economy as 
fundamental (as the operational basis of) all other 
rights. Indeed, give how ‘the individual’ is the 
fundamental social category of human rights per 
se, it is not difficult to understand how human 
rights in themselves have not been a bulwark 
against neoliberalism – and its erosion of the 
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collective foundations of social life, which in turn 
promote and protect cultural diversity or the right 
to culture (cf. Peck, 2010). 
 
By way of conclusion, as the International Bill of 
Human Rights (including the 1966 conventions) 
only tend to feature culture as a dimension of the 
civil, social and economic, the 2005 UNESCO 
Convention arguably remains the principle vehicle 
for the assertion of rights to culture. However, as 
noted, the articles of the Convention, while 
making explicit reference to cultural producers 
and civil society actors, are largely directed at 
‘sovereign’ member states. The actual role of 
individuals and civil organisations in participation 
in the formation or implementation of cultural 
policies for promotion and protection of cultural 
diversity (Article 11) is vague – and so, the role of 
cultural self-determination and freedom in 
relation to a concurrent appeal to human rights, is 
not concrete. The right of each state to its own 
cultural policy (Article 6) is potentially at odds 
with the demand for international cooperation 
(Article 5); and lastly, the "dual nature" of cultural 
goods and services as both commodity (and 
export) and socio-ethnic media of identity and 
value (Article 1) only serves to acknowledge the 
expanse of the problem.  
 
Concluding Reflections and Implications for 
Cultural Policy Research  
 
Cultural Rights as a legal concept emerged 
explicitly in the 1960s, but for reasons we 
discussed above was not implemented in ways 
that allowed for its extension in relation to a 
growing international human rights regime of law. 
The following historical shifts in the relation 
between the nation state and culture, national 
policy governance and economy, and the growing 
role of the UN forming a global discourse on 
development and rights, has made for a complex 
terrain of thought and action. While ostensibly the 
responsibility of UNESCO, an arguably greater 
advance in our comprehension (and thus strategic 
use of) Cultural Rights is the reporting of the UN 
Special Rapporteur for Cultural Rights. UNESCO 
uses ‘rights’ as the basis of all its work, but is not 
explicit in its contending for rights (except perhaps 
in the Gender Equality agenda). Diversity has  
become a radical concept – but was separated 
from its origins in the emerging discourse (in the 
1990s) on Pluralism and the political agency 
afforded by an international legal framework on 
pluralism. 
 
It is a concluding contention of this article that 
while a sufficient conceptual apparatus exists in 
the legal sphere informing us on how human 
rights (or other kinds of right) are applied in a 
given cultural realm, we are lacking a theoretical 
discourse on how rights ‘are’ cultural (in an 
ontological but also epistemic sense), and can be 
defined and defended on cultural grounds by 
cultural actors (not on civil, social or economic 
grounds by parties who regard culture as one 
dimension of their political interests). This article, 
of course, cannot now begin to undertake that 
task. It will conclude, however, by indicating the 
areas or judiciable spheres that Cultural Rights 
should operate within – and the issues that 
emerge from that and directly involve cultural 
policy. 
 
The first is the matter of the ruling assumptions 
on the moral integrity of the arts, the otherwise 
benign character of all culture, and internally 
related to these assumptions, the persistent claim 
that the arts and culture are exempt from social 
norms of moral integrity, observance and offense. 
With some irony, the arts, historically, have 
arguably flourished more or as much under 
authoritarianism as liberalism (or earlier variants 
thereof), though this was in part as art is evidently 
stimulated by resistance to authority. 
Nonetheless, the arts also obviously involve 
hubris, individualism and intense competitiveness, 
and we might note how the arts tend to the realm 
of highly professional, education, specialised, by 
implication socially elite. It is not contentious to 
point out that artists, even today, tend to the 
necessarily single-minded, self-interested and self-
absorbed, and other patterns of behaviour not 
associated with collective cooperation and 
consensus. Rather, challenging all consensus and 
socially binding norms – and in way that do not 
themselves make them obvious candidates for 
creating social cohesion – remind us of the 
historical exceptions that current rights discourse 
makes on behalf of culture (Ivey, 2008). 
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Cultural policy since the 1960s have largely by-
passed the problem of art’s intransigent 
individualism (or, rather, depicted it simply as a 
time-limited feature of European romanticism). 
French and British policy trends in ‘cultural 
democratisation’ (largely for widening 
participation and the means of production) and in 
‘cultural democracy’ (largely for social access to 
arts and culture – to produce as well attend) did 
not generate substantive new conditions of 
artistic practice. With decades of economic and 
cultural policies (and not least public, community-
based funding) the dominance of Western artistic 
individuals and policy trends for MOMAs, 
biennales and cultural festivals all celebrating the 
ascendant artistic ego, continues apace. Given 
how the UN promotes Western-style democracy 
as the basis of human rights, and with it, 
individualism per se is posited as the fundamental 
political category of human society, while non-
individualist forms of cultural agency are not so 
easily acknowledged (Melzer, 1999; Smiers, 2003). 
 
Second, the legal complexion of the social space 
of collective cultural self-determination is not easy 
to understand. Most of the time, cultural activity 
purposively avoids critical, confrontational or 
resistance positions against authority (at least 
where the ‘authorities’ in question are the funders 
of culture). Nonetheless, the legal sphere 
determining the boundaries of social 
representation and activity are contracting, and 
with it the spatial dimension of culture (places, 
actions and discourse). The laws of the land may 
now routinely include the following, all of which 
have implications for rights: Obscenity (all 
countries, most liberal of which are EU countries); 
Libel, Defamation and Slander (all countries); 
Offending the State (e.g. Turkey and many Middle 
East countries); Blasphemy (common to all 
countries where religion has constitutional 
political status); Offending the Church (e.g. 
Greece; Islam has its own version); Confidential 
information (e.g. state security and military); Theft 
or appropriation (e.g. Nazi confiscated art); Hate 
speech (EU; USA) and Terrorism offenses (that 
may include the nebulous actions of glorifying 
terror) (most countries have adopted these). 
Lastly, we may think of Copyright and IP laws as 
almost wholly benign but, as the case of Nadia 
Plesner (above) illustrates, it can be motivated 
against, as well as for, creative freedom. 
 
Thirdly, cultural organisations in Europe – 
particularly the UK – are very good at using the 
rhetoric of rights and justice (particularly access 
and participation – enforced by law, in the UK 
with the Equalities Act 2010, Human Rights Act 
1998 and previous iterations of both these areas 
of law and policy), but they are arguably not so 
effective at understanding or challenging the 
political and legal powers that issue such 
legislation (the role of that rhetoric in ideology 
and formations of political discourse). 
Governments can use rights as a form of 
patronage and a discursive means of promoting 
political ideology, and this needs to become a 
subject of cultural analysis alongside the proposed 
research avenues on policy and Cultural Rights. In 
the UK, the incorporation of policy directives for 
citizen minorities in mainstream cultural life and 
institutions, the elimination of discrimination, and 
the recognition of interest groups, is conducted by 
political fiat of national, local government and 
funding bodies – not involving much public 
deliberation. Consequently, arts and cultural 
organisations are not actually involved in any 
deliberative thinking on rights – or indeed act as, 
in the UN’s terms, Human Rights Defenders in the 
cultural sphere. What would it mean then for arts 
and cultural organisations to be activist or official 
Human Rights Defenders in culture? 
 
By extension, Rights (as an individualisation of 
political behaviour and self-assertion) is 
instrumentally important to the global neoliberal 
order, which has arguably co-opted democracy 
and ‘liberty’ (as noted above, an appeal to the 
supremacy of civil society, access and 
participation as condition of free markets, the 
individual’s right to choose fundamental to 
consumerism, and so on). Critical thinking needs 
to maintain a reflective apprehension on the way 
‘rights’ based thought, legislation and activity, can 
serve, compliment or even provide the social 
conditions for greater economic interests. 
 
We should not necessarily assume a harmony 
between Cultural Rights and the international 
human rights legal regime – even as the UN 
Special Rapporteur is currently fighting hard for 
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both, particularly in relation to women’s rights, 
the specificity and autonomy of the cultural realm 
must be theorised and recognised – culture does 
not always provide for a harmonious or 
constructive society. Culture can be used for 
dissent and an attack on social assumptions, 
widely held values, taboos and collectively 
accepted political ideals or practice. An early study 
from 1974 by Hungarian Imre Szabó and entitled 
Cultural Rights suggested that the very 
philosophical conditions of human rights 
(individual, universal, inalienable and indivisible) 
can only be applied to culture by robbing it of its 
specificity, and moreover its agency for collective 
anti-individualism (Szabó, 1974). Following this, 
we may investigate how Human Rights could rob 
culture of its intellectual and social facility for 
opposing all authority and power (not as an old-
style ‘autonomy of art’, or of the avant-garde 
even, but a contemporary policy theory of 
culture’s autonomy from all institutionalised value 
systems). Cultural Rights may play a more 
effective role outside of human rights altogether, 
if its potential political agency is fully realised – a 
rights seized and deployed, not conferred and 
gratefully received (bottom-up, as the cliché 
goes). 
 
Fourthly, the human rights regime inadvertently 
situates arts and cultural organisations as agents 
of the State, not simply clients or beneficiaries. 
Culture becomes another institutional means of 
State management, bureaucratisation, and the 
means by which the State (and its national 
agendas) finds moral legitimacy. Following this, 
research is needed on how states co-opt the 
ethics of human rights – the acknowledgement of 
the Other, of difference, of tolerance and respect, 
and so on – as internal to the political 
management of public discourse. We are all 
familiar with the character of overt censorship 
(from social intimidation to direct prohibition) but 
less so the self-censorship generated by a fear of 
offending or upsetting the individuals or state 
sponsored groups protected by special rights. 
More objectively, the rise of Hate speech and 
terrorism prevention laws have generated new 
claimants to the guardianship of public speech 
and expression – to which we all to easily assume 
a benign or necessary intent. There is all too little 
cultural policy research representation in broader 
debates on security, extremism, fundamentalism 
(although Karima Bennoune has made that one of 
her areas of focus: UNCGR: 2017). 
 
How both censorship and security permeate the 
strategic management of cultural funding systems 
(priorities, limits, conditions, paucity, competition) 
– as well as access to public space, to non-state 
actors (e.g. religious groups; NGOs; terror groups), 
market agencies (e.g. sponsors; distributors; 
landlords) is a topic directly related to how the 
arts define a discrete sphere of freedom that is 
identified as cultural. What this article has 
attempted to demonstrate above all is that the 
cultural sphere exceeds (cannot be 
comprehensively defined by) the legal 
terminology of rights, whether civil, social, 
economic, or even Human.   
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